his thirty-four years on the Court, Brennan was 50% more likely than the Court as a whole to protect the freedom of speech.A Moreover, in only two cases from 1956 to 1990 didJustice Brennan reject a free speech claim that the Court accepted, and these were both cases in which the regulation of free expression was designed to "improve" the marketplace of ideas. 4 This is a remarkable record, indeed. In this Essay, I will trace a few of the many highlights of Justice Brennan's extraordinary first amendment odyssey. 
(1968) (upholding federal law criminalizing draft card burning).
3 It is noteworthy that, although the percentage of cases in whichJustice Brennan voted to uphold the free speech claim remained essentially the same in the first and second halves of his tenure (87% in the first half vs. 88% in the second half), the Court as a whole upheld 85% the free speech claims from 1956 to 1973, but only 51% from 1973 to 1990. 4 first term on the Court, and it was his first opinion for the Court in a case involving the freedom of speech. It was an opinion he would come to regret. The central holding in Roth was that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." 7 This holding was premised upon four critical judgments. First, in a passage that fully anticipated Robert Bork's philosophy of original intent, Brennan reviewed the status of obscenity at the time the Constitution was adopted and concluded that "there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity ... was outside the protection intended for speech and press." 8 Second, Brennan invoked "the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956." 9 Third, embracing the "two-level" theory of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 10 and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 1 1 Brennan concluded that, because obscenity is one of the "'well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem, ' " 12 it may be restricted "without proof either that ...
[it] will perceptibly create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct, or will probably induce its recipients to such conduct."
13 Finally, Brennan rejected the argument that "obscenity" is too imprecise a concept to meet constitutional standards, declaring that all the Constitution requires "is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices,'"14 and that the existence of "marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous."
Brennan's casual reading of original intent, his uncritical acceptance of the significance of consensus, his embrace of the notion that "obscenity" is "unprotected" because it is "without redeeming social importance," and his cavalier dismissal of concerns about vagueness all reflected the dominant free speech jurisprudence of the time. Anticipating later developments, Brennan did observe in Roth that the "fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free society" and that "[c]easeless vigilance" is therefore "the watchword to prevent their erosion." 16 But in articulating the four critical judgments noted above, Brennan effectively eschewed such vigilance and embraced a highly formalistic, originalist, and wooden approach to first amendment analysis. The following year, Justice Brennan would help set in motion a jurisprudential revolution that eventually would call all these judgments into question. In Roth, though, Brennan got the revolution off to a limping start, indeed.
To deny an exemption to [those] During the post-World War II "cold war" era, fears over national security generated wide-ranging federal, state, and local restrictions on "radical" speech. These restrictions included the extensive use of loyalty oaths, emergency detention programs, attempts to "outlaw" the Communist Party, requirements that communist-front and communist action organizations register with the government, legislative investigations of suspected "subversives," direct criminal prosecutions, and the denial of employment and other governmental "benefits" to individuals who were not "loyal" to the United States.
At the time Justice Brennan joined the Court, such programs were aggressively enforced at all levels of government and the nation was consumed with its effort to suppress subversive expression. Prior to Brennan's appointment, the Court did not take a strong stand in defense of the freedom of speech in the face of this powerful anticommunist campaign. The abuses and overreaching of this era had a profound effect on Justice Brennan's understanding of the freedom of speech. In the eye of this anticommunist hurricane, Brennan first sketched out the contours of his unique contribution to our first amendment jurisprudence.
A central feature of the anticommunist program was the denial of government employment and other benefits to "subversives." In upholding such restrictions, the pre-Brennan Court frequently relied upon the so-called "right/privilege" distinction. This doctrine held that government constitutionally could withhold benefits from individuals who engaged in constitutionally protected expression, for which they could not be criminally punished, because the individuals had no "right" to the "privilege" itself. In Barsky v. Board of Regents, 22 for example, the Court invoked this distinction in upholding the suspension of a physician's medical license because of events arising out of his communist affiliations. Four years later, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Speiser v. Randall 23 emphatically rejected the right/privilege distinction.
Speiser involved a California law that established a special property tax exemption for veterans, but it denied the exemption to any veteran who advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Brennan rejected the state's argument that the disqualification was lawful because it merely withheld a "privilege." Brennan explained that " [t] o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for their speech," because the "deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech." 24 Thus, Brennan concluded, the state was "plainly mistaken" in its "argument that, because a tax exemption is a 'privilege'.. . its denial may not infringe speech." 25 Brennan's rejection of the right/privilege distinction in Speiser was a critical step in the evolution of first amendment doctrine, but it did not end the case. Brennan proceeded in Speiser to articulate a second-and equally important-principle of first amendment jurisprudence.
Turning to the procedure mandated by the California law, Brennan held that the statute violated the first amendment because it required the applicant to prove that he had not advocated the violent overthrow of government. Brennan observed that "[t]he vice of the present procedure is that, where particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken factfinding--inherent in all litigation-will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized." 26 Moreover, such an allocation of the burden of proof effectively could chill free expression since "[t]he man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens." 27 Unlike Brennan's first foray into first amendmentjurisprudence in Roth, which embodied a cautious, formalistic, and tradition-bound approach, his second foray, in Speiser, revealed an impressive willingness to question accepted first amendment doctrine in the light of a more speech-protective conception of the freedom of speech. Moreover, in stark contrast with his opinion in Roth, Brennan's effort in Speiser, inspired by the political and historical realities of the era, displayed an extraordinary sensitivity to the procedures by which government regulates free expression. This special emphasis on procedure, which would play a pivotal role in subsequent decisions limiting government efforts to suppress Justice Brennan's understanding of the freedom of speech was influenced, not only by government efforts to suppress communism, but by the civil rights movement as well. One of the most distinctive features of this movement was its attempt to enlist the support of the federal courts in the protection of federal constitutional rights through a carefully orchestrated strategy of systematic litigation. As Harry Kalven once observed, this effort was designed "to trap democracy in its own decencies. Prior to Brown, the State of Virginia had made no effort to restrict the litigation activities of the NAACP. Shortly after Brown, however, Virginia, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee all enacted legislation that expressly prohibited any organization to retain a lawyer in connection with litigation to which it was not a party and in which it had no pecuniary right or liability. In NAACP v. Button, 34 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held such legislation invalid as applied to the NAACP. Brennan rejected the contention that "'solicitation' is wholly outside the area of freedoms protected by the First Amendment" because "a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels." 5 Brennan explained that "[i]n the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving... equality of treatment... for the members of the Negro community." 3 6 In such circumstances, litigation is "a form of political expression" and "[g]roups which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts." 3 7 For these groups that the NAACP assists, "litigation may be the most effective form of political association. Moreover, in invalidating the Virginia legislation, Brennan elaborated on his concern, first enunciated in Speiser, that the Court must take special care to scrutinize the procedures by which government regulates free expression. Indeed, it was in Button that Brennan first coined the phrase "overbreadth," and it was in Button that Brennan gave impetus to the nascent first amendment vagueness doctrine. Building explicitly upon Speiser, Brennan explained that the "objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth" derives from "the -danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application." 9 Because "[t]hese freedoms are delicate and vulnerable," the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"40 and " [b] ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." 4 1 These themes of "overbreadth," "vagueness," "chilling effect," "breathing space," and "narrow specificity," first clearly articulated by Brennan in Button, would come to dominate the evolution of first amendment jurisprudence for the next quarter century.
[ In New York Times v. Sullivan, 43 Justice Brennan's most prominent first amendment opinion, the Court for the first time considered the extent to which the freedom of speech limits the award of damages in a libel action brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. Sullivan, an elected Commissioner of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a civil libel action against four black clergymen and The New York Times alleging that he had been libeled by statements in a full-page advertisement that described the civil rights movement in the South and concluded with an appeal for funds. The trial judge submitted the case to the jury under instructions that a public official was entitled to recover damages for defamatory statements unless the speaker could prove that the statements were true. Under these instructions, the jury returned a judgment for Sullivan in the amount of $500,000.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rule of law applied by the Alabama court violated the first amendment. At the outset, Justice Brennan confronted the Court's own past declarations, including Brennan's own pronouncement in Roth, that libel, one of the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the doctrine in his opinion for the Court in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972):
[T]he transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing "attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity." This is deemed necessary because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression. Turning to the task of articulating these standards, Brennan observed in an oft-quoted passage that "we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 49 Drawing upon history in a quite different way than he drew upon history in Roth, Brennan analogized the civil law of libel, as applied by the Alabama court, to the Sedition Act of 1798, which had been invalidated "in the court of history" because of the restraint it "imposed upon criticism of government and public officials."
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The essential difficulty, Brennan explained, is that "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate," and even false statements of fact must therefore "be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.
' " 5 1
Thus, the Alabama rule of law could not be "saved by its allowance of the defense of truth," for a "rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all of his factual assertions" would lead to intolerable "self-censorship." 52 Echoing Speiser, Brennan observed that, under such a rule, "would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." 5 3 Such a rule, Brennan added, "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate." 54 With these considerations in mind, Brennan concluded that public officials may not recover damages for defamatory falsehood relating to their official conduct unless they can prove "that the statement was made ... with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 55 Brennan's opinion in New York Times revolutionized the law of libel and, perhaps more important, signalled a critical shift in our first amendment jurisprudence.
Indeed, the distance Justice Brennan-and the Court-had traversed in the seven years from Roth to New York Times is simply stunning. All four of the judgments that made up the core of Brennan's opinion in Roth were effectively reversed in New York Times.
In Roth, Brennan gave great weight to the "originalist" conclusion that, at the time the first amendment was adopted, "obscenity ... was outside the protection intended for speech and press." 56 In New York Times, however, Brennan gave no weight to the "originalist" view, despite his observation in Roth that "[a]t the time of the adoption of the First Amendment" the law of libel was even more "fully developed" than the law of obscenity. 57 In Roth, Brennan gave great weight to the fact that every state restricted the expression of obscenity. In New York Times, however, Brennan gave no weight to the analogous "consensus" about libel. In Roth, Brennan embraced the Chaplinsky-Beauhamais "two-level" theory and held that, because obscenity was "unprotected" by the first amendment, no further constitutional scrutiny was warranted. In New York Times, however, Brennan dismissed the invocation of "the epithet 'libel'" and insisted that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations." 58 and precision of regulation and his reflections in Button about "breathing space" and "chilling effects," to fashion a more sensitive, less formulaic, and more speech-protective mode of first amendment analysis. New York Times did not, of course, "solve" the libel puzzle, for it left many important questions unanswered. What New York Times did do, however, was to take the essential first step in the effort to adjust in an appropriate and sensitive manner the inherently conflicting interests in individual reputation and the freedom of speech. Moreover, by abandoning the strict "two-level" theory of "protected" and "unprotected" expression, Brennan's opinion in New York Times ushered in a new era of first amendment doctrine in which the Court, freed from the rigid constraints of the past, has been able to adopt a more flexible mode of analysis to deal with a broad range of "low value" expression. 59 Finally, by locating "the central meaning of the First Amendment" 60 in the controversy over seditious libel, Brennan's opinion in New York Times identified "a core protection of speech without which democracy cannot function" and thus put the 'theory of the freedom of speech clause ... right side up for the first time."
61 As Alexander Meiklejohn and Harry Kalven observed, the decision in New York Times was truly an "occasion for dancing in the streets."
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New York Times cannot be fully understood without recognizing that it was driven, not only by concerns about free expression, but also, like Button, by the unique historical circumstances in which it arose. Like other devices designed to obstruct the civil rights movement, the $500,000 libel judgment against the Times and the black clergymen who sponsored the advertisement was designed to dampen the drive for civil rights. Indeed, if the Alabama jury's massive damage award had been sustained on the basis of the technical inaccuracies involved in the dispute, then no person or institution would have felt free to challenge racial segregation in the South. New York Times, one of the most important decisions in the history of the first amendment, was thus not only a triumph for free expression; it was a triumph for civil rights and racial equality as well. 
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I am convinced that the approach initiated 16 years ago in [Roth] ...
cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental First Amendment values, and I have concluded that the time has come to make a significant departure from that approach. 63
In the years between Roth and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 64 the Court handed down more than forty decisions dealing with the issue of obscenity. 65 During this era, at least five sharply distinct definitions of obscenity emerged within the Court, no one of which commanded a majority. Moreover, the breakdown of consensus was compounded by disagreement over such issues as pandering and "variable" obscenity. 66 By 1967, the breakdown was so complete that the Court took to deciding cases with one sentence orders that simply announced the judgment of the Court. 67 After sixteen years of such "experimentation and debate,"Justice Brennan finally reached the conclusion in his dissenting opinion in Paris Adult Theatre that "we are manifestly unable to describe [obscenity] except by reference to concepts so elusive that they fail to distinguish clearly between protected and unprotected speech." 68 Brennan thus concluded that "the outright suppression of obscenity cannot be reconciled with the fundamental principles" of the first amendment. 69 Building upon his opinion in Speiser Brennan observed that although "'sensitive tools'" must "be used to carry out the 'separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech,'" in this context the Court had failed "to provide 'sensitive tools' to separate obscenity from other sexually oriented but constitutionally protected speech." 70 Indeed, Brennan reasoned, the concept of obscenity is so inherently vague that it "cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms."
7 1 In such circumstances, "we must scrutinize with care the state interest that is asserted to justify the suppression. For in the absence of some very substantial interest in suppressing such speech, we can hardly condone the ill effects that seem to flow inevitably from the effort." 72 The lessons of Speiser, Button, and New York Times are plainly evident in Justice Brennan's Paris Adult Theatre dissent.
Turning to the task of scrutinizing the state interest, Brennan explained that "[b]ecause we assumed-incorrectly, as experience has proved-that obscenity could be separated from other sexually oriented expression without significant costs, ... we had no occasion in Roth to probe the asserted state interest in curtailing sexually oriented speech." 73 Putting aside "the state interests in protecting children and in protecting unconsenting adults," 74 Brennan observed that society's more generalized interests in suppressing obscenity remain "essentially unfocused and ill defined" and are "predicated on unprovable .. . assumptions about human behavior, morality, sex, and religion." 75 Because such assumptions "cannot validate a statute that substantially undermines the guarantees of the First Amendment," 76 Brennan concluded that, "at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults," 77 government cannot constitutionally attempt "wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents." 79 Brennan also demonstrated his personal commitment to the proposition that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market," 8 0 for he recognized that the Court's rejection of his position was itself only provisional. If his colleagues continued to confront this view, they, too, might eventually see the error of their ways.
[W]ith the rigid characterization of a given locale as not a public forum, there is a danger that certain forms of public speech at the locale may be suppressed, even though they are basically compatible with the activities otherwise occurring at the locale.
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At the time Justice Brennan joined the Court, public forum doctrine was still in its infancy. 82 Although the Court had recognized a rudimentary right of individuals to speak in public streets and parks, subject to reasonable regulation of time, place, and manner, it had not yet addressed the issues involved in access to other forms of public property. This was an issue that captured Justice Brennan's energy and attention through most of his tenure. It was an issue on which he was all too often on the losing side.
Because the formative decisions of the 1930s and 1940s predicated the right to a public forum on the fact that streets and parks had been used "time out of mind" for speech purposes, 83 they carried the implication that there exists no first amendment right to use other forms of public property for such purposes. The implication, in other words, was that access to such property for speech purposes could be denied absolutely upon the state's naked assertion of title. Not surprisingly, then, in one of the first decisions to address this issue after Brennan's appointment, the Court, over Brennan's dissent, proclaimed that "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." 84 In case after case throughout his tenure, Brennan argued for a more expansive vision of the right to a public forum. In Greer v. Spock, 85 for example, Brennan dissented from the Court's holding that a military base could constitutionally exclude all political activity, including speeches and leafleting, from the public areas of the base. Although conceding that the military could "exclude civilian traffic" entirely, Brennan maintained that it "could not choose freely to admit all such traffic save for the traffic in ideas." 8 6
Brennan rejected the contention that the challenged restriction could bejustified by references to "the national defense," for "if the recent lessons of history mean anything, it is that the First Amendment does not evaporate with the mere intonation of interests such as national defense, military necessity, or domestic security." 87 Recalling New York Times, Brennan reminded the Court that such "interests 'cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support any exercise of ... power.'" 8 8 Finally, Brennan rejected the Court's argument that the interest in "military neutrality" could justify the restriction, for "it borders on casuistry to contend that by even-handedly permitting public expression to occur in unrestricted portions of a military installation, the military will be viewed as sanctioning the causes there espoused." Unlike the Court, which readily accepted the contention that "if fairgoers are permitted to distribute literature, large crowds will gather, blocking traffic lanes and causing safety problems," 92 Brennan pointed out that the fair officials had "failed to provide any support for these assertions" and had made "no showing that relaxation of the booth Rule would create additional disorder in a fair that is already characterized by the robust and unrestrained participation of hundreds of thousands of wandering fairgoers." 93 The restriction, Brennan concluded, was "not narrowly drawn to advance the State's interests, and for that reason is unconstitutional." 94 Finally, in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 95 Brennan dissented from the Court's holding that a city constitutionally could prohibit the posting of signs on all public property. At the outset, Brennan observed that the posting of signs is "a timehonored" and "particularly valuable" means of communicating because "it entails a relatively small expense in reaching a wide audience, allows flexibility in accommodating various formats ... and conveys its message in a manner that is easily read and understood." 96 This means of expression, Brennan maintained, is "'essential to the poorly financed causes of little people, ' " 97 and its prohibition should be sustained only "if the government proves that the ban ... furthers a substantial government objective, and ... constitutes the least speech-restrictive means of achieving that objective." 9 8 Criticizing the Court for failing "to consider carefully" whether the city's "supposed commitment" to "eradicating 'visual clutter'" was "genuine," 99 Brennan argued that "such statements of aesthetic objectives should be accepted as substantial.., only if the government demonstrates that it is pursuing an identified objective seriously and comprehensively and in ways that are unrelated to the restriction of speech." 10 In Brennan's view, such formulae served only "to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues." 10 6 Moreover, Brennan consistently chided the Court for its "insensitivity" 10 7 to the need for a broad conception of the public forum and its "cursory ... oversight" 10 8 of the interests asserted by government. Brennan's own conception of the public forum-that in all cases the "crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time" 109 -offered a generous vision of the right. In Brennan's view, a robust "marketplace of ideas" necessarily presupposes an expansive public forum right that guarantees access to a broad range of nonmainstream means of communication for the expression of unpopular and unorthodox ideas and opinions. As Brennan well understood, such an expansive approach is essential if we are to assure the breadth, diversity, and richness of the system of free expression.
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. 110 Near the end of his tenure, Justice Brennan faced one of the most controversial, emotional, and divisive issues he was to confront as ajustice. Not surprisingly, he addressed the issue with clarity of vision and strong commitment to the freedom of speech.
At the 1984 Republican National Convention, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag to express his opposition to government policy. He was prosecuted and convicted of violating a Texas statute that prohibited any person from desecrating the flag. The statute defined "desecrating" as physically mistreating the flag in a way that the actor "knows will seriously offend" others. The Court invalidatedJohnson's conviction in a bitterly divided fiveto-four decision, with Justice Brennan writing the opinion. To the contrary, government may act only in accord with narrowly drawn and precise regulations, and even highly provocative expression may not be restricted on this basis unless it "'is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
' "1 1 5
Brennan also rejected the state's argument that Johnson's conduct fell within the "fighting words" doctrine. Embracing a narrow construction of that doctrine, reminiscent of his approach to libel in New York Times, Brennan Although conceding the legitimacy of this interest, Brennan explained that the objection was not to the State's ends, but to its means of achieving them. Because the Texas law was "not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances," but at protecting "it only against impairments that would cause serious offense to others,"Johnson's "political expression was restricted because of the content of the message he conveyed." 118 In such circumstances "the State's asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic character of the flag" must be subjected "to 'the most exacting scrutiny.'" 1 19
Undertaking such scrutiny, Brennan invoked the "enduring lesson" of the Court's prior decisions: "Government may not prohibit expression simply because it disagrees with its message." 120 The Court had "never before ... held that the Government may ensure that a symbol be used to express only one view of that symbol or its referents," 121 and Brennan was not about to breach that wall in Johnson, for "[t]o conclude that the Government may permit designated symbols to be used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries."
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In an eloquent peroration, Brennan concluded by observing that the decision in Johnson "is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and source of our strength." 1 2 3 In a sharp response to the dis- 
